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Hedging with “Financial Weapons of Mass
Destruction”: Cleaning Up the Fallout of Treating All
Derivative Transactions Between Bank Affiliates the
Same.
I. INTRODUCTION
Derivatives are one of the most misunderstood products in our
financial markets today. 1 Much has been made of speculative derivative
products, as they are often cited as causes of the Financial Crisis of 2008
(“the financial crisis”)2 and have been made infamous by Hollywood
movies3 and congressional hearings. 4 Warren Buffet famously called
derivatives “financial weapons of mass destruction.”5 These financial
products played a role in exacerbating the financial crisis, 6 in particular
AIG’s spectacular credit default swap losses and its resulting bailout. 7
The outcome of such a dramatic event during the financial crisis has

1. Shelly Antoniewicz, Derivatives—Please Don’t Let Them Be Misunderstood, INV.
CO. INST. (Feb. 22, 2016), https://www.ici.org/viewpoints/view_16_derivatives_imf.
2. See Kimberly Amadeo, Role of Derivatives in Creating Mortgage Crisis: The True
Cause of the Mortgage Crisis, THE BALANCE (June 30, 2017), https://www.thebalance.com/
role-of-derivatives-in-creating-mortgage-crisis-3970477 (“The real cause of the 2008
financial crisis was the proliferation of unregulated derivatives in the last decade.”).
3. See, e.g., THE BIG SHORT (Plan B Entertainment & Regency Enterprise 2015)
(explaining credit default swap’s role in the Financial Crisis).
4. See Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 23, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/business/economy/24panel.html
(describing the congressional testimony of Alan Greenspan in the wake of the financial crisis).
5. Letter from Warren Buffett, Chairman of the Bd., Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to the
Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 15 (Feb. 21, 2003).
6. See Mark Gongloff, Derivatives are Weapons of Slow Economic Destruction: Study,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 14, 2013, 1:23 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/14/
derivatives-weapons-destruction_n_3442229.html (“[T]he financial crisis showed that
derivatives make the system way more dangerous by encouraging these banks and investors
to pile up more and more risk.”).
7. See Bruce Tuckman, In Defense of Derivatives: From Beer to Financial Crisis, CATO
INST. CTR. FOR MONETARY & FIN. ALT. POLICY ANALYSIS, No. 781 (Sept. 29, 2015) https://
object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa781.pdf ([AIG’s] failure and bailout were due
to losses partly from credit default swaps and partly—and comparably—from nonderivative
mortgage products.”).
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caused derivatives to be generally seen as risky and dangerous financial
products.8
However, not all derivative transactions are like the highly
speculative trades that helped bring the financial markets to the brink of
collapse.9 Common derivative products, such as futures, forwards,
options, and swaps, are regularly used in risk-mitigating transactions to
hedge against investments in all industries. 10 These hedging derivatives,
as opposed to speculative derivatives, can reduce losses when goods,
currency, securities, or resources a company relies on fall in value. 11
These hedging transactions are common practice for financial and nonfinancial institutions as a way to limit their losses, and are a major
component of risk management for many companies, 12 including Warren
Buffet’s Berkshire Hathaway. 13
Following the financial bailout of AIG and others, Congress
sought to institute new regulation to restrict speculative derivative
transactions.14 Passed in 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) addressed many of the
speculative uses of derivatives that were seen as contributors to the
financial crisis.15 Dodd-Frank actively distinguishes transactions for

8. See Ron Hera, Forget about Housing, The Real Cause of the Crisis was OTC
Derivatives, BUSINESS INSIDER (May 11, 2010, 2:50 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
bubble-derivatives-otc-2010-5 (“From the perspective of those outside the bubble, the
explosion of OTC derivatives is a mania.”).
9. See Craig Donofrio, Maybe Derivatives Aren’t So Bad After All, THE STREET (Apr.
3, 2014, 8:04 AM), https://www.thestreet.com/story/12785552/1/maybe-derivatives-arentso-bad-after-all.html (describing a study that has shown that derivatives for hedging purposes
actually increase a company’s value).
10. Kimberly Amadeo, Derivatives, Their Risks and Their Rewards?, THE BALANCE
(Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.thebalance.com/what-are-derivatives-3305833.
11. See Tuckman, supra note 7, at 2 (“Derivatives enable those enterprises to run largescale operations without bearing commensurately large business risks that could threaten their
survival.”).
12. See Tuckman, supra note 7, at 1 (“The vast majority of large businesses use
derivatives to hedge their business risks.”).
13. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Column, Derivatives, as Accused by Buffett, N. Y. TIMES
(March 14, 2011, 9:17 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/03/14/derivatives-asaccused-by-buffett/?_r=0 (“In the fourth quarter [of 2011] alone, Berkshire made $222
million on derivatives.”).
14. Shahien Nasiripour, Derivatives Just “A Sophisticated Form of Gambling,”
U.S. Senators Say; Propose Bill Allowing State Gambling Laws to Apply ,
H UFFINGTON P OST, (Mar. 18, 2010, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/20
09/11/10/derivatives-just-a-sophis_n_352994.html.
15. See generally SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DODD-FRANK SPOTLIGHT: DERIVATIVES, https:/
/www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/derivatives.shtml (last modified May 4, 2015).
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speculative purposes from those used for hedging in a number of its
sections. 16 However, it does not differentiate between the two in its
changes to Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act (“Section 23A”)17 and
Regulation W, the statute and Federal Reserve regulation governing
transactions between Federal Reserve member banks (“member banks”)
and their affiliates.18
The amendment to Section 23A in the Dodd-Frank Act requires
that all derivative transactions with bank affiliates, including those used
for hedging purposes, are to be considered “covered transactions” to the
extent that the transaction causes a member bank or a subsidiary to have
credit exposure to the affiliate. 19 If these transactions create credit
exposure, the amendment requires that the transactions meet certain
qualitative, quantitative, and collateral standards set forth in Section
23A. 20 These standards, such as limiting transactions between member
banks with any of their affiliates to those transactions of less than 10% of
the bank’s available capital, affect how some banks manage their risk and
could increase the systemic risk of banking institutions. 21
Despite the negative effect of these standards, the Federal
Reserve Board (“FRB”) has not yet revised Regulation W to define
“credit exposure” in light of the passage of Dodd-Frank and the
amendments to Section 23A. 22 The FRB should revise Regulation W so
that the interpretation of “credit exposure” is viewed strictly, ensuring
the standards of covered transactions under Section 23A do not apply to
derivative transactions that are made for good-faith hedging and risk
management purposes.23 Such an interpretation would alleviate the

16. See Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(C) (2016)) (distinguishing between
hedging and speculative proprietary trading); id. §716, 15 U.S.C. §8305(a) (repealed 2014)
(exempting financial institutions from being considered swap dealers if swaps used for
hedging purposes only).
17. Dodd-Frank § 608(a), 12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(7)(G) (2016).
18. 12 C.F.R. § 223.33 (2017).
19. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(7) (2016).
20. Id. § 371c; see infra Part III.A.
21. James I. Kaplan & Corbin J. Morris, Dodd-Frank Amendments to Sec 23A Are
Problematic: Part 1, L AW360 (Jan. 7, 2014, 1:29 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
498401/dodd-frank-amendments-to-sec-23a-are-problematic-part-1.
22. Regulation W – The Operational Challenges, ACCENTURE, http://financeandriskbl
og.accenture.com/regulatory-insights/regulatory-compliance/regulation-w-the-operationalchallenges (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
23. See Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21 (emphasizing that interpretation of ‘credit
exposure’ may lessen impact).
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negative impacts of the Section 23A while also remaining consistent with
Dodd-Frank.24
This Note proceeds in six parts. Part II details what derivative
transactions are and how they are used in affiliate transactions. 25 Part III
discusses how derivative transactions are regulated under both Section
23A and Regulation W, and the changes made to these regulations by
Dodd-Frank.26 Part IV describes the negative impacts of the changes and
how an exception for hedging transactions would mitigate these
unintended consequences.27 Part V discusses how the FRB can craft such
an exception by narrowly defining credit exposure under Regulation W.28
Part VI encourages adoption of this exception and concludes the Note. 29
II. DERIVATIVES AND AFFILIATE TRANSACTIONS
A.

What is a Derivative?

Financial derivatives are defined as “financial instruments that
are linked to a specific financial instrument or indicator or commodity,
and through which specific financial risks can be traded in financial
markets in their own right.”30 In other words, a derivative is a contract
between two parties that commit to exchange goods, such as cash or
securities, if the underlying asset meets a specified metric.31 Such metrics
include interest rates, currency exchange rates, and commodity, credit,
and equity prices.32 Derivatives that are tied to these types of metrics
include structured debt obligations, swaps, futures, options, caps, floors,
collars, forwards, and various combinations thereof. 33 These products are
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
Financial Derivatives, INT’L MONETARY FUND, https://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/
fd/index.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
31. See Tuckman, supra note 7, (explaining how derivatives work through the example
of a brewery).
32. Derivatives, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, https://www.occ
.gov/topics/capital-markets/financial-markets/derivatives/index-derivatives.html (last visited
on Sept. 17, 2017).
33. See generally Thomas Lee Hazen, Rational Investments, Speculation, or Gambling?
Derivative Securities and Financial Futures and Their Effect on the Underlying Capital
Markets, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 987 (1992) (in-depth derivative product description).
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often attractive to many companies, banks, and other financial institutions
as they generally do not require any upfront payment and are written in a
legal form that allows for swift remedial action in the event of a default
without the approval of a bankruptcy court. 34 Derivatives are generally
transacted for two purposes: hedging and speculation.35
In the context of a derivative transaction used for hedging
purposes, the derivative traded is usually tied to an underlying asset that
could create a loss for the hedging company if the asset’s price rises or
falls. 36 A classic example of a hedging transaction would be an interest
rate swap.37 An interest rate swap is an exchange of interest rates between
two financial instruments. 38 Generally, a banker owns a product of which
the rate is variable or floating, and the banker would rather have a fixed
rate.39 In that case, an investor will offer to make a deal: if the floating
rate stays above a certain specified rate, the investor will pay the banker
the difference between the specified rate and the floating rate. 40
However, if the rate falls below the specified rate, the banker will have to
pay the investor the difference. 41 This essentially allows the banker to
change the floating interest rate into a fixed rate, “hedging” the risk of
any rise in interest rates.42 The other purpose of a derivative transaction
is speculation.43 An investor speculates that interest rates will drop, so
he or she will bet that over the long run, the variable rate will be lower
that the fixed interest rate they offered to the banker, and he or she will

34. Tuckman, supra note 7, at 2.
35. See Sam Peterson, There’s a Derivative in Your Cereal, THE ATLANTIC (July 29,

2010), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/07/theres-a-derivative-in-yourcereal/60582 (comparing speculative over-the-counter derivative products with hedging
derivatives that a vast majority of large companies use).
36. See id. (explaining that derivatives are often tied to goods and services businesses
rely on for profits).
37. Interest Rate Swaps, PIMCO, https://global.pimco.com/en-gbl/resources/education/
understanding-interest-rate-swaps (last visited Oct. 7, 2017).
38. See Hera, supra note 8 (describing an interest rate swap transaction).
39. See Tuckman, supra note 7 (explaining how derivatives work through the example
of a brewery).
40. See Hera, supra note 8 (describing an interest rate swap transaction).
41. See Tuckman, supra note 7 (explaining how derivatives work through the example
of a brewery).
42. See Tuckman, supra note 7 (giving the example of a brewer hedging the price of
wheat futures to maintain a consistent price of beer over a long period of time without
worrying about the rise and fall of the price of wheat).
43. See Hera, supra note 8 (describing the dangers of speculative derivatives).
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end up receiving more money from the banker than he or she will have to
pay to them. 44
Because they appeal both to risk-averse and risk-seeking
investors, derivative transactions have an enormous impact on the
American financial system, as most large companies use derivatives for
one or both purposes.45 A 2009 survey found that 94% of Fortune Global
500 companies used derivatives. 46 Another study earlier in the decade
found that 88% of almost 7,000 nonfinancial firms with listed stock
across forty-seven countries used derivatives. 47 Of the more than 2,000
nonfinancial firms in the United States in that same study, 94% used
derivatives.48
B.

Derivative Transactions Between Banks and Their Affiliates

Derivative transactions are not only entered into between
unaffiliated investors, but also transactions between affiliates, 49 which are
commonly used as a hedging mechanism by many large, multinational
financial institutions and banks. 50 These transactions generally arise
either when an institution finds it unfavorable to hedge directly due to the
risk generated by a transaction or if the institution is unable to hedge the

44. Hera, supra note 8.
45. Tuckman, supra note 7.
46. ISDA Research Notes, ISDA (Apr. 23, 2009), https://www.isda.org/a/yPDDE/isda-

research-notes2.pdf.
47. See Tuckman, supra note 7, at 2 (citing Söhnke Bartram, Corporate Hedging and
Speculation with Derivatives, (2015), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=891190.).
48. See Tuckman, supra note 7, at 2 (citing Söhnke Bartram, Corporate Hedging and
Speculation with Derivatives, (2015), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=891190.).
49. “Affiliate” with respect to a member bank under Section 23A means: (1) Parent
companies; (2) Companies under common control by a parent company; (3) Companies
under other common control; (4) Companies with interlocking directorates; (5) Sponsored
and advised companies; (6) Investment Companies in which the member bank or affiliate is
an investment advisor; (7) Depository institution subsidiaries; (8) Financial subsidiaries;
(9) Companies held under merchant banking or insurance company investment authority; (10)
Partnerships associated with the member bank or affiliate; (11) Subsidiaries of affiliates; and
(12) Other companies the FRB finds appropriate to label as an affiliate. 12 C.F.R. § 223.2
(2017).
50. See ERNST & YOUNG, DODD–FRANK AND INTER–AFFILIATE TRADING OF
DERIVATIVES, http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-Dodd%E2%80%93Frankand-inter%E2%80%93affi-liate-trading-of-derivatives/$FILE/EY-Dodd%E2%80%93Frankand-inter%E2%80%93affi-liate-trading-of-derivatives.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 2010)
(“[M]any large multinational companies have moved toward centralizing their hedging and
derivatives trading operations through the use of [centralized derivative holding entity].”).
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risk directly because it is not authorized to hold the hedging asset. 51 In
either case the institution may have an affiliate acquire the hedging asset
instead. 52 The institution would then engage in a bridging derivative
transaction between itself and the affiliate holding the hedging asset. 53
The advantages of such a transaction are numerous, including having a
comprehensive view of risk and liquidity across portfolios, centralized
risk management, savings in collateral posted, reduced transaction costs,
and other tax and accounting benefits. 54 This type of transaction also
limits systemic risk by insuring against the failure of the underlying asset
within the overall company structure, rather than transacting with
excessive unaffiliated entities. 55
Other derivative transactions between a member bank and its
affiliates are affiliate-driven. 56 To accomplish its risk management goals,
an institution’s affiliate may enter into an interest rate or foreignexchange derivative transaction with the institution. 57 For example, an
institution’s holding company may hold a substantial amount of floatingrate assets, but issue fixed-rate debt securities to obtain cheaper funding. 58
The holding company may then enter into a fixed-to- floating interestrate swap with its subsidiary member bank to reduce the holding
company’s interest-rate risk.59 This would result in the bank being
protected from any changes in interest rates and normalizing its cashflows, thereby meeting its risk management goals. 60

51. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., SUPERVISION MANUAL,
INTERCOMPANY TRANSACTIONS 20 (2008).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 50, at 2.
55. See SCOTT C AMMARN ET AL., CADWALADER WICKERSHAM & TAFT LLP, C LIENT
ALERT: THE DODD-FRANK ACT’S IMPACT ON AFFILIATE TRANSACTIONS (Apr. 21, 2011), http:/
/www.cadwalader.com/resources/clients-friends-memos/the-dodd-frank-acts-impact-onaffiliate-transactions#_ftn23 (explaining that less systemic risk created by using affiliated
derivative transactions than unaffiliated ones).
56. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 52, at 20.
57. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 52, at 20.
58. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 52, at 20.
59. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 52, at 20.
60. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 52, at 20.
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III. REGULATING DERIVATIVE TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN BANKS AND
THEIR AFFILIATES
A.

Section 23A Provisions

With the establishment of federal deposit insurance during the
Great Depression, there was a fear of bank runs caused by ill-advised
banking transactions costing the government billions in insurance
payouts. 61 One method of protecting banks from misusing funds was to
limit their transactions with their affiliates. 62 Section 23A was passed by
Congress through the United States Banking Act of 1933 as an addition
to the Federal Reserve Act of 1933, which regulates affiliate transactions
of member banks.63 Section 23A requires that certain “covered
transactions” between Federal Reserve member banks and their affiliates
are subject to qualitative limits, quantitative standards, and collateral
requirements. 64 Covered transactions include numerous types of
transactions, such as loans or extensions of credit, purchases of
investment securities by either the parent or affiliate, and securities
transactions that would cause a member bank or subsidiary to have credit
exposure to an affiliate, among others. 65
The limits on a member bank’s covered transactions require that
transactions with any single affiliate cannot exceed 10% of the bank’s
capital, and transactions with all bank affiliates cannot exceed 20% of the
bank’s capital. 66 An extension of credit by the bank to an affiliate and
any guarantee on behalf of an affiliate must be secured by a defined
amount of collateral.67 Further, all covered transactions between a bank
61. See Julia Maues, Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall), FED. RESERVE HISTORY (Nov.
22, 2013), https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/glass_steagall_act (describing the
reasoning behind many of the provisions of Glass-Steagall).
62. See id. (stating tighter regulations were passed on member banks, including their
affiliates).
63. Id.
64. The definition of affiliate under this statute is extremely broad, as it includes parent
companies, companies under common control of parent company, companies under other
common control, companies with interlocking directorates, sponsored and advised
companies, investment companies for which the member bank or its affiliate serve as an
investment adviser or has control over, depository institution subsidiaries, financial
subsidiaries, and companies held under merchant banking or insurance company investment
authority. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(1) (2016).
65. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(7) (2016).
66. Id. § 371c(a)(1)(A-B).
67. Id. § 371c(c).
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and its affiliate must be on terms and conditions that are consistent with
safe and sound banking practices. 68 Finally, a bank is generally
prohibited from purchasing “low-quality assets”69 from its affiliates.70
These standards are subject to exemption, 71 which include loans or
guarantees to an affiliate which are fully secured by U.S. government
obligations,72 the purchase of assets with a readily available market
quotation at the quoted price from an affiliate, 73 or the deposit of funds in
the affiliate bank in the ordinary course of correspondent business. 74
Congress later added additional restrictions to affiliate
transactions.75 Non-member banks and covered insured thrifts were
included under the restrictions of Section 23A. 76 Additionally, in 1987,
Congress added Section 23B, a twin section to Section 23A. 77 Under
Section 23B, covered transactions must be conducted as an arm’s length
transaction78 or in good faith as if it were done between non-affiliated
companies.79

68. Sound banking practices requires that the bank shall consider, as appropriate, the
interest rate, credit, liquidity, price, foreign exchange, transaction, compliance, strategic, and
reputation risks presented by a proposed activity, and the particular activities undertaken by
the bank must be appropriate for that bank. Further, the bank must believe that all obligations
can be met, as well maintaining records of transactions for examination purposes. 12 C.F.R.
§1.5 (2017).
69. “Low-quality assets” are defined as: an asset (including a security) classified as
“substandard,” “doubtful,” or “loss,” or treated as “special mention” or “other transfer risk
problems,” either in the most recent report of examination or inspection of
an affiliate prepared by either a Federal or State supervisory agency or in any internal
classification system used by the member bank or the affiliate (including an asset that
receives a rating that is substantially equivalent to “classified” or “special mention” in the
internal system of the member bank or affiliate); an asset in a nonaccrual status; an asset on
which principal or interest payments are more than thirty days past due; an asset whose terms
have been renegotiated or compromised due to the deteriorating financial condition of the
obligor; and an asset acquired through foreclosure, repossession, or otherwise in satisfaction
of a debt previously contracted, if the asset has not yet been reviewed in an examination or
inspection. 12 C.F.R. § 223.3(v) (2017).
70. 12 U.S.C. §371c(a)(3) (2016).
71. Id. § 371c(a)(4).
72. Id. § 371c(d)(4).
73. Id. § 371c(d)(6).
74. Id. § 371c(d)(3).
75. Staff Letter to Board of Governors of Federal Reserve, Regulations implementing
Sections 23A and 23B of the Fed. Reserve Act (Apr. 24, 2001).
76. Id.
77. 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1 (2016).
78. Id. § 371c-1(a)(2)(A).
79. Id. § 371c-1(a)(1)(B).
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Regulation W

With the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”) in
1999, member banks had a far greater breadth of transactions available
between themselves and their affiliates. 81 GLBA repealed provisions of
the Glass-Steagall Act that prohibited depository institutions and
investment banks from consolidating; under GLBA, a bank holding
company could now have both investment banks and depository
institutions as subsidiaries and affiliates. 82 This change drastically
deregulated the banking industry. 83 A flood of mergers and acquisitions
followed the passage of the bill, giving rise to many of our modern-day
banking behemoths, such as J.P. Morgan Chase, Citigroup, and Bank of
America.84
After GLBA became law, Section 23A became the central
statutory mechanism for protecting depository institutions from the
potentially risky activities of their affiliates. 85 Within GLBA, the FRB
was required to adopt rules to address “credit exposure arising out of
derivative transactions” between banks and their affiliates. 86 In response,
the FRB issued Regulation W,87 a regulatory implementation of both
Section 23A and 23B. 88 Regulation W codifies various FRB decisions
made in prior years and clarifies interpretations of the statute in light of
the enactment of GLBA. 89 Regulation W specifies certain exceptions and
exemptions to Section 23A, excluding derivative transactions from the
80

80. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub.L. 106–102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
81. See Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled

Promise of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1683, 1707 (2011)
(“[T]hose more numerous affiliated entities engaged in a much broader range of newly
permissible financial activities.”).
82. See Omarova, supra note 82, at 1706 (“The enactment and implementation of the
GLB Act . . . finally removed the Glass-Steagall’s Act prohibition on combining commercial
and investment banking under common corporate ownership.”).
83. See David Leonhardt, Washington’s Invisible Hand, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Sept.
26, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/28/magazine/28wwln-reconsider.html (“[I]t’s
easily the biggest piece of financial deregulation in recent decades.”).
84. See id. (“Thus were born Citigroup, Bank of America and J. P. Morgan Chase,
behemoths that owned bank branches, bought and sold stocks and shepherded corporate
mergers.”).
85. Omarova, supra note 81, at 1683.
86. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(f)(3)(A) (2016).
87. 12 C.F.R. § 223 (2017).
88. Omarova, supra note 81, at 1697-98.
89. Omarova, supra note 81, at 1698.
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definition of covered transactions, but does not define “credit
exposure.”90
Under Regulation W, banks are required to establish and maintain
internal policies and procedures regarding their credit exposure to
affiliates under derivatives transactions, rather than comply with the
covered transaction requirements. 91 These policies include monitoring
and controlling the credit exposure by imposing appropriate credit limits,
mark-to-market requirements, and collateral requirements by the member
banks. 92
Notably, the FRB did consider subjecting derivative
transactions to the standards of covered transactions, but felt that their
reliance on bank-designed policies and procedures, Section 23B’s armlength requirements, and active examiner supervision were enough to
regulate bank-affiliate derivatives.93
C.

Section 23A Amendments under Dodd-Frank

In response to the financial crisis, Congress sought to drastically
change the regulatory atmosphere of the financial industry, specifically
in how derivatives were regulated.94 As derivatives were widely regarded
as a cause of the financial crisis, 95 several derivative-focused provisions
were included in Dodd-Frank.96 In particular, Dodd-Frank significantly
changed how derivative transactions were regulated between affiliates. 97
90. See Transactions Between Banks and Their Affiliates, 67 Fed. Reg. 76560, 76588
(Dec. 12, 2002) (“The Board is not prepared at this time to subject credit exposure arising
from bank-affiliate derivatives to all the requirements of section 23A.”) (codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 223.33 (2017)).
91. 12 C.F.R. § 223.33 (2017).
92. To the Officer in Charge of Supervision and Appropriate Supervisory and
Examination Staff at each Federal Reserve Bank and to Domestic and Foreign Banking
Organizations Supervised by the Federal Reserve from the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve, Docket No. SR 03-2 (Jan. 9, 2003).
93. Id.
94. Marcy Gordon, Congress Urged to Stiffen Rules for Derivatives Trading, SEATTLE
TIMES (Mar. 11, 2010), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/congress-urged-to-stiffenrules-for-derivatives-trading/.
95. Amadeo, supra note 2.
96. Dodd-Frank, §§ 712, 716, 721-722, 731, 764; see generally PAULA S. GREENMAN ET
AL., S KADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP, CLIENT ALERT: REGULATION OF OVERTHE -C OUNTER D ERIVATIVES UNDER THE DODD-FRANK WALL S TREET R EFORM AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT https://files.skadden.com/newsletters%2FFSR_A_Regulation_of_Overthe-Counter_Derivatives.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2017) (detailing specific derivative
transaction regulations in Dodd-Frank).
97. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 52, at 20.
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Despite the FRB’s reluctance to do so when issuing Regulation W, DoddFrank amended Section 23A to include under covered transactions a
“derivative transaction . . . with an affiliate, to the extent that the
transaction causes a member bank or a subsidiary to have credit exposure
to the affiliate.”98 The bill does not make any reference to the purpose of
the derivative transaction, choosing instead to regulate both hedging and
speculative derivative transactions in the same way. 99 Electing not to
exempt hedging activities from the same standards as speculative trades
was inconsistent with other separate provisions in the Act. 100
Additionally, Dodd-Frank declines to address the definition of “credit
exposure,” choosing to leave it to regulatory authorities. 101
Because the definition was left to regulatory authorities,
regulatory interpretation was needed to determine the definition of “credit
exposure” following the Act’s passage and implementation.102 The FRB
discussed a “consistent definition” of credit exposure in contemplating
the expected amendment to Regulation W to follow the Section 23A
changes, 103 but such a definition was never implemented. 104 Rather, the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) introduced methods
of determining credit exposure on a quantitative basis for derivative
affiliate transactions that do not include a distinction between speculative
and hedging derivative transactions.105 Thus, without any regulatory
clarification from the FRB, speculative and hedging derivative
transactions are treated equally for the purposes of affiliate
transactions.106

98. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(b)(7)(f) (2016).
99. Id.
100. See Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. 1851(d)(1)(C) (2016)) (distinguishing between

hedging and speculative proprietary trading); id. §716, 15 U.S.C. §8305(a) (repealed 2014)
(exempting financial institutions from being considered swap dealers if derivatives used
swaps for hedging purposes).
101. See Omarova, supra note 81, at 1765 (“[A]gency action will ultimately determine
whether this provision of the Dodd-Frank Act affects any real change in large banking
organizations’ derivatives dealing and trading.”).
102. Omarova, supra note 81, at 1765.
103. Chris Bruce, Fed Staff Aiming for Consistent Definition on Derivatives-Related
Credit Exposures, [2013] Banking Daily (BNA) No. 07 (Aug. 13, 2013).
104. ACCENTURE supra note 22.
105. 12 C.F.R. §§ 32, 159, 160 (2017).
106. CAMMARN ET AL., supra note 55.
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IV. A NECESSARY EXEMPTION
Treating all derivative transactions equally under Section 23A,
regardless of purpose, was a mistake by Congress. 107 Given speculative
derivative transactions’ negative effect on the economy during the
financial crisis, more regulatory oversight was reasonable. 108 However,
holding hedging derivative transactions to the same standards under
Section 23A as those for speculative purposes limits banks’ flexibility in
risk management, increases the overall systemic risk of derivatives, and
creates costly compliance issues. 109 Exempting these hedging derivative
transactions would alleviate these issues. 110
A.

More Flexible Risk Management

Treating hedging and speculative derivative transactions the
same way under Section 23A undermines banks’ efforts to ensure safe
and reliable risk management.111 The misuse of derivative transactions
leading up to the financial crisis created a great deal of mistrust in all
derivative-related transactions.112 However, this mistrust should not
extend to derivative transactions with affiliates for hedging purposes, as
they are a central element in many companies’ risk management policies,
particularly those of banks and other financial institutions. 113 The
inclusion of these transactions under the covered transaction standards of
Section 23A decreases the flexibility and usefulness of these risk
management procedures. 114

107. See Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21 (discussing problems with the amendments to
Section 23A).
108. Mark Gongloff, Derivatives are a Weapon of Slow Economic Destruction: Study,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 14 2014, 1:23 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/14/
derivatives-weapons-destruction_n_3442229.html. (explaining the downsides of derivatives).
109. Infra Part IV.A–C.
110. See CAMMARN ET AL., supra note 55, at 9 (questioning why Congress did not include
hedging transactions as exempt from covered transactions as they had in Volker and Lincoln
Amendments).
111. Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21.
112. See Gordon, supra note 94 (showing an example of the pressure put on Congress to
increase regulation on derivatives due to their supposed role in crisis).
113. See supra Part II.B.
114. Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21.
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Covered transactions under Section 23A are limited by the 10%
limitation imposed by Section 23A. 115 This limitation’s negative effect
is best shown by how it impacts hedging transactions with a central
derivative entity. 116 Many member banks have established a non-bank
central entity for all derivatives business for risk management
purposes.117 In this risk management structure, bridging derivatives are
transacted between the central entity and the bank when a trade is made
with an outside company.118 This protects the parent member bank
against the risk of the trade, as the affiliate takes on the investment risk
for which it is better equipped than the bank. 119 These transactions
between the parent bank and central entity are considered affiliate
derivative transactions and as such may be subject to the standards of
covered transactions under Section 23A if they are deemed to create a
credit exposure to the affiliate. 120 These standards constrain a bank’s
bridge derivative transactions with the parent bank, limiting the number
of hedging transactions that they would otherwise undertake. 121 Because
of these constraints, banks may either have to completely change their
risk management protections or use a similar hedging strategy with a third
party.122
Discouraging banks from engaging in derivative hedging
transactions between affiliates limits their risk management flexibility. 123
Flexibility is beneficial to banks as it allows a more bank-specific risk
management approach.124 The flexibility to include these transactions in
a risk management strategy for financial entities can create a more
115. See Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21 (“Such common structures (and there are others,
of course) now are severely limited by the 10 percent limitation imposed by Section 23A.”).
116. Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21.
117. AZAM H. AZIZ ET AL., SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, CLIENT ALERT: DODD-FRANK
ACT: DERIVATIVES AS CREDIT EXTENSIONS OF BANKS (Aug. 16, 2010)
http://www.shearman.com/~/media/files/newsinsights/publications/2010/08/doddfrankact—derivatives-as-credit-extensions-__/files/view-full-memo-doddfrank-act—derivativesas-cre__/fileattachment/fia081710derivativesascreditextensionsofbanks.pdf.
118. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 52, at 20.
119. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 52.
120. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 52, at 21.
121. See AZIZ ET AL., supra note 117, at 15 (“The 10-percent limit in many instances could
constrain a bank’s back-to-back derivatives with a nonbank that serves as the central
management point depending on the Fed’s definition of ‘credit exposure.’”).
122. AZIZ ET AL., supra note 117, at 15.
123. Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21.
124. See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 50 (encouraging each company to design a risk
management strategy that is the most beneficial to themselves).
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comprehensive view of risk and liquidity across portfolios, centralized
risk management, savings in collateral posted, reduced transactions costs,
and other tax and accounting benefits. 125 Without allowing an exemption
for risk-mitigating hedging activities done in good faith under Section
23A, member banks would be unable to structure their risk management
policies in order to meet institution-specific needs.126
For example, a financial institution may reasonably feel that, due
to specific investments, a risk management structure that includes
derivative transactions with a central affiliate entity is the best way to
hedge their risk. 127 However, if credit exposure is defined broadly,
transactions between institution and parent will be subject to the
restrictions of section 23A, regardless of the transaction’s purpose.128
This may cause the financial institution to not implement this strategy,
despite believing it is best for its company, due to Section 23A’s
regulatory requirements.129 In that way, Section 23A is discouraging
institutions from following what they believe to be the best risk
management for its investments. 130 However, if hedging transactions
were exempted from the standards of Section 23A, such a company
would be much more likely to use the most advantageous risk
management strategy without fear of compliance or regulatory issues. 131
Eliminating the requirement for derivative transactions for
hedging purposes to follow the standards of Section 23A would not
change or limit other restrictions on derivatives within the Dodd-Frank
Act.132 Rather, this would only permit more flexible risk management
strategies without subjecting them to unnecessary and limiting

125. See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 50.
126. See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 50.
127. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 52, at 20 (explaining

that banks often use central affiliate entities to hedge risk).
128. 12 U.S.C. § 371c (2016).
129. See Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21 (explaining the regulatory requirements that
would keep banks away from hedging with affiliate derivative transactions.).
130. See Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21 (emphasizing that because of amendments, if a
bank chooses to follow such a risk management strategy, it is now severely limited by the
10% limitation imposed by Section 23A).
131. See Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21 (explaining the banks would use such strategies
if not for the problematic changes to 23A)
132. See Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(C) (2016) (distinguishing between
hedging and speculative proprietary trading); Dodd-Frank §716, 15 U.S.C. § 8305(a)
(repealed 2014) (exempting financial institutions from being considered swap dealers if
derivatives used swaps for hedging purposes).
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regulation. 133 Financial institutions would be able to manage their risk in
the way best suited to their companies. 134 Speculative derivative
transactions that have no risk management value would still be required
to meet the Section 23A covered transaction requirements.135 Exempting
hedging transactions from Section 23A’s standards would encourage the
types of activities that enhance banks’ risk management policies while
also discouraging derivative transactions that have greater risk. 136
B.

Reduction of Systemic Risk

After the financial crisis, Congress passed Dodd-Frank with a
stated goal of “promot[ing] the financial stability of the United States.”137
However, holding derivative transactions for hedging purposes to the
same requirements as speculative transactions under Section 23A runs
counter to that aim. 138 By subjecting derivative affiliate transactions to
such requirements, Dodd-Frank discourages banks from entering into
hedging transactions with affiliated parties. 139 This leads to banks
increasingly looking to third parties for hedging derivative trades rather
than their own affiliates.140 Using third parties for hedging derivative
transactions spreads the leverage of the derivative trade throughout the
market rather than within a bank’s own affiliates.141 Spreading leverage
of a derivative trade throughout the market increases systemic risk in the
financial market, as “liquidity shock at one bank is more likely to cause
133. See Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21 (emphasizing that because of amendments, if a
bank chooses to follow such a risk management strategy, it is severely limited by the 10%
limitation imposed by Section 23A).
134. Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21.
135. 12 U.S.C. § 371c (2016).
136. See CAMMARN ET AL., supra note 55 (implying that Volcker and Lincoln Exemptions
allowed banks to maintain these risk management policies).
137. Dodd-Frank § 1376.
138. See CAMMARN ET AL., supra note 55 (“Section 608 seems at odds with the overall
purposes of the Dodd-Frank Act to reduce systemic risk to the financial services industry;
Section 608 will inadvertently encourage banks to enter into hedging transactions with other
nonaffiliated entities, thereby increasing the intertwined relationships and systemic risks
among banks.”).
139. CAMMARN ET AL., supra note 55.
140. See CAMMARN ET AL., supra note 55 (“The application of . . . quantitative limit[s],
coupled with the imposition of collateral requirements – with no exemption for bona fide
hedging transactions – may lead some banks to enter into hedging transactions with third
parties rather than with affiliates, simply in order to preserve the bank’s 23A quantitative limit
capacity.”).
141. Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21.
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liquidity problems at other connected banks because the same shock is
spread over fewer banks and is therefore larger and more
destabilizing.”142 The more parties that are involved in a derivative
transaction, the greater the systemic risk to the financial markets. 143
Exempting good-faith risk-mitigating derivative hedging
transactions from Section 23A covered transaction standards reduces
concerns over systemic risk. 144 This is because it reduces the number of
intertwined derivatives in the market by encouraging derivative
transactions in-house rather than with third-parties. 145 If banks are
encouraged to use risk management practices such as the central hedging
entity, they will hedge their transactions without tying third-parties to the
derivatives.146 Keeping hedging derivatives attached to an affiliate will
allow all the benefits of flexible risk management procedures, while also
reducing systemic risk.147
C.

Easing the Compliance Burden

In addition to the increased systemic risk and reduction of risk
management strategies, the inclusion of derivative transactions for
hedging as covered transactions increases the compliance burden,
specifically with Section 23A’s Attribution Rule.148 The Attribution Rule
of Section 23A may now apply to certain affiliate derivative transactions,
which creates a difficult and expensive compliance burden on the
banks. 149 The Attribution Rule states that any transaction with a company
is treated as a transaction with an affiliate of such company “to the extent
the proceeds of the transaction are used for the benefit of, or transferred

142. Janet L. Yellen, Fed. Reserve Bd. of Governors, Interconnectedness and Systemic
Risk: Lessons from the Financial Crisis and Policy Implications, Address at the American
Economic Association/American Finance Association Joint Luncheon (Jan. 4, 2013).
143. Id.
144. See CAMMARN ET AL., supra note 55 (inversing the theory that derivative transactions
increase systemic risk if the current rule remains in place).
145. CAMMARN ET AL., supra note 55.
146. See Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21 (explaining that a lack of risk management
flexibility to use central derivative entities will actually increase systemic risk by tying banks
to one another in a greater amount).
147. Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21.
148. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(2) (2016); see Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21 (arguing that
many more regulations kick into place when following under covered transaction).
149. Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21.
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to, that affiliate.”150 This was included in Section 23A to prevent a bank
from evading the restrictions in the section by using intermediaries and
to limit the exposure that a bank had to customers of affiliates of the
bank. 151 Under Section 23A, if a borrower obtains a loan from a bank
and uses the proceeds to make a payment to an affiliate of the bank, the
loan is considered a covered transaction under the Attribution Rule. 152
A larger problem, however, is that the Attribution Rule applies
even where the bank does not have knowledge that the proceeds of its
preexisting loan—or other transaction—have been used to make
payments to its affiliate.153 With the addition of derivatives as covered
transactions, the Attribution Rule now “ostensibly extends” to any
derivative payment made by a bank to a third party where the third party
has a separate obligation to the bank’s affiliate. 154 Even if trade proceeds
are not “transferred to” the affiliate, there is still a risk that the transaction
is made “for the benefit of” the affiliate.155 This Rule was never intended
by the FRB to apply to derivative transactions, as derivative transactions
were specifically left out of the requirements of covered transactions
under Regulation W.156 With the inclusion of derivative transactions, the
Attribution Rule now greatly increases compliance risks and can create
both an accounting and monitoring nightmare. 157 This rule complicates
even the most basic derivative transactions with third parties and makes
compliance extremely difficult. 158

150. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(2) (2016).
151. See Transactions Between Banks and Their Affiliates, 66 Fed. Reg. 24,185, 24,190

(May 11, 2001) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 223 (“This ‘attribution rule’ was included in
section 23A to prevent a bank from evading the restrictions in the section by using
intermediaries and to limit the exposure that a bank has to customers of affiliates of the
bank.”).
152. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(2) (2016).
153. Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21.
154. Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21.
155. Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21.
156. BD. OF GOV. OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., ADOPTION OF REGULATION W IMPLEMENTING
SECTIONS 23A AND 23B OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT (Jan. 9, 2003) (“The final rule does
not subject credit exposure arising from bank-affiliate derivatives to the quantative limits and
collateral requirements of Section 23A.”).
157. See DIXON H UGHES GOODMAN LLP, UNDERSTANDING REGULATION W (Sept. 2004),
http://www2.dhgllp.com/res_pubs/RAS-Reg-W-Article.pdf (“This nuance provides for a lot
of interpretation risks on behalf of banks and can create both an accounting and monitoring
nightmare.”).
158. See Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21 (explaining that because the Attribution Rule
applies even when a bank has no knowledge that the proceeds of its preexisting loan (or other
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Exempting hedging derivative transactions from Section 23A
covered transaction requirements will save money and will reduce
monitoring issues, as these hedging transactions will no longer fall within
the Attribution Rule. 159 Exempting such transactions would eliminate
costs and issues involved with compliance.160 At the same time, however,
the goals of Dodd-Frank will still be met, as speculative derivative trades
will still be monitored and complied with under the Attribution Rule. 161
V. CRAFTING THE EXEMPTION
A.

A Federal Reserve Interpretation

As discussed, an exemption for derivative transactions whose
purpose is for good-faith hedging and risk management reasons is
beneficial for risk management, systemic, and compliance reasons. 162
Although Congress could take it upon themselves to specify that the
standards that apply for derivative transactions under Section 23A do not
apply to hedging transactions, it is far more likely and easier for the FRB
to take action through an update of Regulation W in light of the changes
to Section 23A in Dodd-Frank.163 Updating Regulation W would allow
the FRB to define the meaning of “credit exposure” under the
regulation. 164 In determining the definition, the FRB should specify that
credit exposure is only created between a member bank and its affiliate
by derivative transactions made for non-hedging purposes. 165 This would
exempt derivative trades for hedging purposes from the standards of

transaction) have been used to make payments to its affiliate, it will be almost impossible to
know if the bank is in compliance or not).
159. See Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21 (emphasizing that not treating hedging
derivatives differently creates cost and monitoring issues).
160. See DIXON HUGHES GOODMAN LLP, supra note 157 (explaining as currently
structured, Section 23A can be costly and troublesome minefield).
161. See Infra Part V.B.
162. Supra Part IV.
163. Bruce, supra note 104.
164. See Bruce, supra note 104 (stating that Federal Reserve may merely interpret or issue
rules, and are not required to pass a new bill).
165. See supra Part IV (explaining that the benefits of derivative transactions for hedging
purposes are being excluded from Section 23A covered transaction standards).
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covered transactions under Section 23A, as only derivative transactions
causing credit exposure are subject to Section 23A policies.166
Although no action has yet been taken, the FRB has considered a
“consistent” definition of credit exposure to apply not only to affiliate
derivative transactions, but also to apply to some other credit
exposures.167 It is unclear if a desire for a wider approach will affect the
thinking of the definition under Section 23A, but such an interpretation
should refrain from casting a wide net in regards to what applies to credit
exposure. 168 A broader definition will include derivative transactions for
hedging purposes, continuing current practice. 169 If instead the definition
is restricted to only speculative derivative transactions, hedging
derivative transactions would be exempted from the requirements of
Section 23A.170 Such a position would be both beneficial and consistent
with the Dodd-Frank Act.171
B.

Consistent with Dodd-Frank’s Other Risk-Mitigating
Exemptions

Language that is consistent with exempting risk-mitigating
derivative transactions from higher regulatory standards can be found
elsewhere in Dodd-Frank.172 In the Volcker Rule,173 Congress created an
exception to the ban on proprietary trading and private equity and hedge
fund investing so long as the transactions are made for “risk-mitigating
hedging activities . . . designed to reduce the specific risks to the banking
entity in connection with and related to such positions, contracts, or other
166. See 12 U.S.C §371c(b)(7)(G) (“a derivative transaction . . . with an affiliate, to the
extent that the transaction causes a member bank or a subsidiary to have credit exposure to
the affiliate.”).
167. Bruce, supra note 104.
168. See Omarova, supra note 81, at 1765 (“[A]gency action will ultimately determine
whether this provision of the Dodd-Frank Act affects any real change in large banking
organizations’ derivatives dealing and trading.”).
169. Omarova, supra note 81. at 1765.
170. Omarova, supra note 81, at 1765.
171. Dodd-Frank § 619, 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(C) (2016).
172. Id.
173. See SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP, CLIENT ALERT: THE VOLCKER
RULE (last visited Oct. 10, 2017) https://files.skadden.com/newsletters%2FFSR_The_V
olcker_Rule.pdf (“The ‘Volcker Rule’ prohibits an insured depository institution and its
affiliates from: engaging in ‘proprietary trading;’ acquiring or retaining any equity,
partnership, or other ownership interest in a hedge fund or private equity fund; and sponsoring
a hedge fund or a private equity fund.”).
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holdings.”174 This exemption establishes that transactions made with the
intent of mitigating risk are the types of transactions that Congress sought
to encourage, while those speculative—and inherently riskier—
transactions should be subject to higher regulatory standards. 175 The
intent of the trade was Congress’ primary concern.176
The Volcker Rule was not the only provision of Dodd-Frank to
include such an exemption.177 The since-repealed Lincoln Amendment,
also known as the “swaps-pushout rule,” eliminated federal assistance to
any swaps dealers that traded in speculative derivative transactions. 178
Similar to the Volcker Rule, the Lincoln Amendment exempted financial
institutions that would otherwise be considered swaps dealers so long as
they limited their derivative trading activities to hedging and other similar
risk-mitigating measures.179 This allowed financial institutions that use
derivatives to hedge—sometimes via affiliates—from being considered a
swaps dealer, as Congress sought to encourage hedging derivatives
activity while more closely monitoring and regulating speculative
trading. 180 In fact, this exception was added in conference to address
concerns raised by Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”)
Chairman Sheila Bair and FRB Chairman Ben Bernanke that the Lincoln
Amendment would be harmful to the financial industry by forbidding
firms to use swaps and other derivatives as a part of their risk
management structure.181 Again, an exclusion was allowed based on the
intent of the derivative-trading party.182

174. Dodd-Frank § 619; 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(C) (2016).
175. SCOTT CAMMARN ET AL., CADWALADER WICKERSHAM & TAFT LLP, CLIENT ALERT:

AN ANALYSIS OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT’S VOLCKER RULE (Oct. 15, 2010) http://
www.cadwalader.com/resources/clients-friends-memos/an-analysis-of-the-dodd-frank-actsvolcker-rule [hereinafter ANALYSIS OF VOLKER RULE].
176. See id. (“The language suggests that motives of the banking entity
when initially acquiring the security or instrument are highly relevant.”).
177. See 15 U.S.C. § 8305(a) (repealed 2014) (exempting risk-mitigating hedging
activities).
178. 15 U.S.C. §8305(a) (repealed 2014).
179. Id. § 8305(d)(1)(A).
180. Id.
181. SCOTT CAMMARN ET AL., CADWALADER WICKERSHAM & TAFT LLP, C LIENT ALERT:
THE LINCOLN AMENDMENT: BANKS, SWAP DEALERS, NATIONAL TREATMENT AND THE FUTURE
OF THE AMENDMENT, (Dec. 14, 2010), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=
6d4652ef-84ac-4750-ab3a-3f22727ccbb6.
182. See ANALYSIS OF VOLKER RULE, supra note 176 (“The language suggests
that motives of the banking entity when initially acquiring the security or instrument are
highly relevant.”).
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With both amendments, Congress actively sought to ensure that
using a derivative transaction as a risk-mitigating activity remained
available without higher regulatory standards to financial institutions. 183
This was both for the benefit of banks as well as in the interest of limiting
systemic risk. 184 Congress looked to the intent of the party making the
derivative transaction to determine if such a transaction needed higher
regulatory standards.185
C.

Defining Credit Exposure

One of the chief concerns with the Volcker Rule’s exemption for
risk-mitigating activities is that it is far too open to interpretation being
that it is based on the intent of the parties, rather than following clear,
black-letter rules. 186 Jamie Dimon, CEO of JPMorgan Chase, has said
that under the Volcker Rule, “you have to have a lawyer and a psychiatrist
sitting next to you determining what was your intent every time you did
something.”187 This concern is based on the regulatory language of the
Volcker Rule, which requires that an exempted risk-mitigating
transaction be “designed to reduce or otherwise significantly mitigate and
demonstrably reduces or otherwise significantly mitigates one or more
specific, identifiable risks.”188 The “designed to” language is the intent
of the parties, which is a clear grey area.189
Such language would not be ideal in the interpretation of credit
exposure by the FRB.190 In many derivative transactions, it is unclear
whether the transacting parties are making a trade for speculative or
hedging purposes. 191 As such, in drafting an interpretation of credit
183. CAMMARN ET AL., supra note 55.
184. CAMMARN ET AL., supra note 55.
185. See ANALYSIS OF VOLKER RULE, supra note 176 (“The language suggests

that motives of the banking entity when initially acquiring the security or instrument are
highly relevant.”).
186. ANALYSIS OF VOLKER RULE, supra note 176.
187. Dan Fitzpatrick & Scott Patterson, Dimon Applauds Certainty with Final Volcker
Rule, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 11, 2013) https://www.wsj.com/articles/dimon-says-jp-morgan-willspend-2-billion-on-controls-in-2014-1386769150.
188. 12 C.F.R. § 44.5(b)(2)(ii) (2017).
189. Thilo Schweizer, Volker Rule Approved, INST. OF INT’L FIN. (Jan. 2014) https://
www.iif.com/system/files/volcker_rule_approved_feb2014.pdf.
190. See id. (explaining that there is still considerable room for interpretation of the scope
of the exemptions).
191. See generally Hazen, supra note 33 (providing an in-depth discussion of the
derivative products).
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exposure to allow derivative transactions for hedging and risk-mitigating
purposes, the FRB should make its best efforts to clearly identify what
types of derivative transactions would be considered for purposes of
hedging and risk-mitigating transactions.192 However, even if a clearer
interpretation is impossible, the opening of a grey area of regulatory
interpretation would still be an improvement from completely banning
such transactions.193
VI. CONCLUSION
Unlike other aspects of Dodd-Frank, the amendments to Section
23A do not include an exception for hedging derivative transactions
between affiliates.194
Congress should have included such an
195
exemption.
Derivative hedging transactions with affiliates play a
major role in how a financial institution manages risk and credit
exposure. 196 These financial institutions manage the market risk by
having an affiliate acquire the hedging asset, then bridge the hedge to the
parent company. 197 This limits systemic risk by insuring against the
failure of the underlying asset within the overall company structure,
rather than transacting with unaffiliated entities. 198 These transactions
are important for risk management in the financial industry and are the
types of transactions that regulators should be encouraging rather than
rendering more costly and difficult. 199 Derivatives may be mistrusted
creatures, but a regulatory body that encourages better risk management,
no matter the financial instrument, is healthier for financial markets and
economic stability.200
The FRB should, in its eventual updated rule on affiliate
transactions, interpret “credit exposure” as not applying to derivative

192. See supra Part IV.
193. See supra Part IV.
194. See CAMMARN ET AL., supra note 55 (explaining that it is unclear as to why risk-

mitigating hedging was not also included in the Sec. 23A amendments of Dodd-Frank).
195. Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21.
196. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 52.
197. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 52.
198. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 52.
199. Kaplan & Morris, supra note 21.
200. Charles Goodhart & Wolf Wagner, Regulators Should Encourage More Diversity in
the Financial System, VOX: CEPR’S POLICY PORTAL (Apr. 12, 2012), http://voxeu.org/
article/regulators-should-encourage-more-diversity-financial-system.
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transactions between affiliates that are made in good-faith for hedging
and risk-mitigating purposes. 201 This would allow financial institutions
to establish more flexible risk management profiles, reduce systemic risk,
and ease the compliance maelstrom, all while maintaining the strict
regulatory oversight of speculative derivative transactions. 202 Despite
potential issues in its application, such an interpretation would still be in
the best interests of the industry and financial markets.203 Congress has
already used this type of exception within Dodd-Frank and should again
do so with affiliate transactions. 204 Hedging derivative transactions are
used to protect banks from risks, and accordingly should not treated like
the “financial weapons of mass destruction” described by Warren
Buffet.205
PATRICK D. MORRIS

201. Supra Part IV.
202. See CAMMARN ET AL., supra note 55 (explaining that it is unclear as to why risk-

mitigating hedging was not also included in the Sec. 23A amendments of Dodd-Frank).
203. Supra Part IV.
204. Supra Part V.
205. Letter from Warren Buffett, Chairman of the Bd., Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to the
Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 15 (Feb. 21, 2003).
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